Paul Ricoeur Time And Narrative Volume 3 Pdf
- and pdf
- Saturday, December 19, 2020 4:54:12 PM
- 0 comment
File Name: paul ricoeur time and narrative volume 3 .zip
Philosophers writing on time, too, usually over- look the contribution of narrative to a critique of the concept of time. Ricoeur finds a "healthy circle" between time and narrative: time is humanized to the extent that it portrays temporal experience. Ricoeur here examines the creation of meaning at the textual level, with narrative rather than metaphor as the ruling concern.
Paul Ricoeur (1913—2005)
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below! Time and narrative. Bibliography: p. Includes index. Narration Rhetoric. Time in literature. Mimesis in literature. Plots Drama, novel, etc.
History— Philosophy. R '. Intuitive Time or Invisible Time? Husserl Confronts Kant 3. Fiction and Its Imaginative Variations on Time 6. The Reality of the Past 7. The World of the Text and the World of the Reader 8. The Interweaving of History and Fiction 9. Should We Renounce Hegel? Towards a Hermeneutics of Historical Consciousness Conclusions Notes Bibliography Index PART IV Narrated Time Introduction This fourth part of Time and Narrative is aimed at as complete an explication as possible of the hypothesis that governs our inquiry, namely, that the effort of thinking which is at work in every narrative configuration is completed in a refiguration of temporal experience.
This fourth part consists of two sections. The first is aimed at presenting an aporetics of temporality as what stands over against this power of refiguration. This entry into the problem of refiguration by way of an aporetics of temporality calls for some justification.
But, if it were to be something more than banal observations, such a study on my part would have required means of psychosociological inquiry and analysis that I do not possess. If the notion of temporal experience is to be worthy of its name, we must not confine ourselves to describing the implicitly temporal aspects of the remolding of behavior by narrativity.
We need to be more radical and bring to light those experiences where time as such is thematized, something that cannot be done unless we introduce a third partner into the discussion between historiography and narratology, the phe1 2 3 3 4 Narrated Time nomenology of time-consciousness. In fact, it is this consideration that has guided me ever since Part I, where I preceded my study of Aristotle's Poetics by an interpretation of the Augustinian conception of time. From that moment on, the course of the analyses in this fourth part was determined.
The problem of the refiguration of temporal experience can no longer be confined within the limits of a psycho-sociology of the influences of narrativity on human behavior. In this way, the problem of the refiguration of time by narrative finds itself brought to the level of a broad confrontation between an aporetics of temporality and a poetics of narrativity.
This is why an initial section will be entirely devoted to the aporetics of temporality. The second section of this volume will be devoted to such an exploration. The five chapters of section 1 focus upon the main difficulty that the aporetics of temporality will reveal, namely, the irreducibility of one to the other, even the occultation of one by the other, of a purely phenomenological perspective on time and an opposed perspective that, to be brief, 1 will call the cosmological one.
My aim will be to discover what resources a poetics of narrative possesses for, if not resolving, at least making this aporia work for us.
We 4 Introduction shall be guided by the dissymmetry that occurs between historical narrative and fictional narrative when we consider their referential implications, along with the truth-claim made by each of these two great narrative modes. Only historical narrative claims to refer to a " r e a l " past, that is, one that actually happened.
Fiction, on the contrary, is characterized by a kind of referring and a truth claim close to those I explored in my Rule of Metaphor. This problem of relatedness to the real is unavoidable. The question of the relation of history to the past no longer appears, then, on the same level of investigation as does the question of its relation to narrative, even when the epistemology of historical knowledge includes within its field the relation of explanation to eyewitness testimony, documents, and archives, and when it derives from this relation Francois Simiand's well-known definition of history as knowledge in terms of traces.
The question of the meaning of this definition is posed by a secondorder kind of reflection. History as a form of inquiry stops with the document as a given, even when it raises to the rank of document traces of the past that were not meant to serve as the basis for a historical narrative. The invention of documents, therefore, is still an epistemological question. What is no longer an epistemological question is the question about the meaning of the intention by which, in inventing documents in the double sense of the word " i n v e n t " , history is conscious that it is related to events that " r e a l l y " happened.
The document becomes a trace for this consciousness, that is, as I shall make more explicit at the proper time, it is both a remains and a sign of what was but no longer is. To put this question in more familiar terms, how are we to interpret history's claim, when it constructs a narrative, to reconstruct something from the past?
What authorizes us to think of this construction as a reconstruction? Let me immediately say that it is in terms of this framework that we shall examine the 5 5 Narrated Time mediation brought about by reading between the world of the text and the world of the reader, announced at the end of Part I.
It is along this path that we shall seek in particular for the true parallel to be given, on the side of fiction, to what we call historical "reality. The hermeneutic of the " r e a l " and the " u n r e a l " goes beyond the framework assigned by analytic philosophy to the question of reference. The task of the following five chapters will be to reduce the gap between the respective ontological intentions of history and fiction in order to make sense of what, in volume 1 , 1 was still calling the interweaving reference of history and fiction, an operation that I take to be a major stake, although not the only one, in the refiguration of time by narrative.
Here I will confine myself to indicating that it will be by interweaving the chapters devoted respectively to history chapters 4 and 6 and to fiction chapters 5 and 7 that step-by-step I shall construct the solution to the stated problem of interweaving reference chapter 8.
Every phenomenology admits, along with Kant, that time is a collective singular, without perhaps really succeeding in giving a phenomenological interpretation of this axiom. At this stage of our investigation, the term " h i s t o r y " will cover not only recounted "history," whether in the mode of history or in that of fiction, but also history as made and undergone by human beings.
With this question, the hermeneutics applied to the ontological intention of historical consciousness will take on its fullest scope. It will definitively surpass, while prolonging, our analysis of historical intentionality in Part II of this work.
Have we exhausted the aporetics of 6 Introduction time by examining the conflict between the phenomenological and the cosmological perspectives on time, and with the complementary examination of phenomenological interpretations of the axiom of the oneness of time? Have we not on several occasions come close to another aporia of time, more deeply rooted than the preceding ones, without having made it the object of any direct treatment?
I have added a conclusion in the form of a postscript dealing with this reservation. What is more, our concern to reap the benefits of the central argument of the initial part of Augustine's valuable insight—that is, the discordant-concordant structure of time—did not permit us to take into account the aporias that are the price of this discovery. On the contrary, it is meant to indicate, in terms of an initial example, the striking fact about the theory of time that any progress obtained by the phenomenology of temporality has to pay for its advance in each instance by the ever higher price of an even greater aporicity.
Husserl's phenomenology, which is the only one with good reason to claim the title of being a " p u r e " phenomenology, will more than verify this disconcerting law.
Behind Aristotle stands an entire cosmological tradition, according to which time surrounds us, envelops u s , and dominates us, without the soul having the power to produce it. For Augustine, our division of time into days and years, as well as our ability to compare long and short syllables, familiar to the rhetoricians of antiquity, designate properties of time itself. Distentio animi is the very possibility of so measuring time. Instead it constitutes one indispensable link in this argument.
Yet this refutation is, from the start, misdirected. In so doing, he is forced to see in the distension of the mind the principle for the extension of time. But the arguments by which he thinks he succeeds in doing so do not hold up. The hypothesis that all movement—that of the sun, just like that of the potter's wheel or the human voice—may vary, hence accelerate, slow down, even stop altogether, without the intervals of time being altered in any way, is unthinkable, not only for a Greek, for w h o m sidereal movements are absolutely invariable, but for us today, even though we know that the movement of the earth around the sun is not absolutely regular and even though we must continually extend our search for the absolute clock.
Even the corrections that science continues to make in defining the notion of a " d a y " — a s a fixed unit for computing months and years—attests that the search for an absolutely regular movement remains the guiding idea for any measurement of time. This is why it is simply not true that a day would remain what we call a " d a y " if it were not measured by the movement of the sun. It is true that Augustine was unable to abstain entirely from referring to movement in order to measure the intervals of time.
So the recourse to the " m a r k s " that time borrows from movement leads nowhere. The lesson Augustine draws from this is that time is something other than movement. Aristotle would have come to the same conclusion, but this would have constituted no more than the negative side of his main argument, namely, that time has something to do with movement, although it is not movement.
But Augustine was unable to perceive the other side of his own argument, having limited himself to refuting the less refined thesis, the one where time is purely and simply identified with the movement of the sun, moon, and stars. As a result he was forced to make the impossible wager that the principle of their measurement could be found in expectation and memory. In the same way, when I recite a poem, as I move along through the 5 13 Narrated Time present, the past increases by the same amount as the future diminishes.
We must ask therefore what increases and what diminishes, and what fixed unit allows us to compare these variable durations. Unfortunately, the problem of comparing successive durations is only pushed back one step. We shall later show how important it is for a theory of narrative that both approaches to the problem of time remain open, by way of the mind as well as by way of the world. The three-stage argument leading to the Aristotelian definition of time in Book IV of the Physics 2 1 9 a 3 4 - 3 5 needs to be followed through step by step.
This argument holds that time is related to movement without being identical with it. In this, the treatise on time remains anchored in the Physics in such a way that the originality belonging to time does not elevate it to the level of a "principle," an honor reserved for change alone, which includes local movement.
This concern not to tamper with the primacy of movement over time is evident in the very definition of nature at the beginning of Book II of the Physics: "nature is a principle [arkhe] or cause [aitia] of being moved and of being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and notaccidently" 1 9 2 b 2 1 - 2 3. The fact that time, nevertheless, is not movement 2 1 8 b 2 1 - 2 1 9 a l 0 was stated by Aristotle before Augustine.
Change movement is in every case in the thing that changes moves , whereas time is everywhere in everything equally. Change can be rapid or slow, whereas time cannot include speed, 7 8 9 14 The Dispute between Augustine and Aristotle under the threat of having to be defined in terms of itself since speed implies time. The conclusion to this first phase of the overall argument confirms this. This dependence of time with regard to change movement is a sort of primitive fact, and the task later will be to graft the distension of the soul in some way to this something that "belongs to movement.
In order to lay the groundwork for this argument, Aristotle first posits the analogical relation that holds between the three continuous entities: magnitude, movement, and time.
As for the relation between before and after, it consists in a relation of order resulting from a continuous division such as this. Thus the relation between before and after is in time only because it is in movement and it is in movement only because it is in magnitude. But also in time the distinction of before and after must hold, for time and movement always correspond with each other" al5— The second phase of the argument is completed. Time, we said above, has something to do with movement, but with what aspect of movement?
With the before and after in movement. Whatever the difficulties in founding the before and after on a relation or order based on magnitude as such, and on the transfer by analogy from magnitude to movement and from movement to time, the point of the argument is not in doubt: succession, 10 11 12 15 Narrated Time which is nothing other than the before and after in time, is not an absolutely primary relation.
It proceeds by analogy from an ordering relation that is in the world before being in the s o u l.
Time And Narrative\, Volume 1
Reviews aclysm hanging over most texts written after the Great War is not what LaCapra means by "history," his notion of history remains unclear. In the chapter on Woolf, he talks of "social relations" and "institutions," but he is eUiptical, for the institutions are described as those "that regulate repetitive temporality" p. In his conclusion, he refers to contexts of"the petty intrigues in Restoration France, the world of the intelligentsia in Czarist Russia, or life in the Midlands in 'ante-Reform' England" p. The suggestion is tiiat the book he hasjust completed brought its reader into each of those worlds, matching texts with contexts. He has not merely avoided the great historical events that surrounded his chosen novelists; he has also avoided all the aspects of personal history which provided the raw material for the worlds they created.
Sign in Create an account. Syntax Advanced Search. Time and Narrative, Volume 3. Paul Ricoeur. University of Chicago Press Paul Ricoeur in Continental Philosophy. Edit this record.
Time and Narrative, Volume 3
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below! Time and narrative.
An encyclopedia of philosophy articles written by professional philosophers.
Paul Ricoeur was among the most impressive philosophers of the 20th century continental philosophers, both in the unusual breadth and depth of his philosophical scholarship and in the innovative nature of his thought. He was a prolific writer, and his work is essentially concerned with that grand theme of philosophy: the meaning of life. His constant preoccupation was with a hermeneutic of the self, fundamental to which is the need we have for our lives to be made intelligible to us. Though a Christian philosopher whose work in theology is well-known and respected, his philosophical writings do not rely upon theological concepts, and are appreciated by non-Christians and Christians alike. He lost both his parents within his first few years of his life and was raised with his sister Alice by his paternal grandparents, both of whom were devout Protestants.
Du kanske gillar. Time and Narrative: v. Ladda ned. Spara som favorit. In the first two volumes of this work, Paul Ricoeur examined the relations between time and narrative in historical writing, fiction, and theories of literature.
ГЛАВА 87 Веспа выехала в тихий переулок Каретерра-де-Хуелва. Еще только начинало светать, но движение уже было довольно оживленным: молодые жители Севильи возвращались после ночных пляжных развлечений. Резко просигналив, пронесся мимо мини-автобус, до отказа забитый подростками. Мотоцикл Беккера показался рядом с ним детской игрушкой, выехавшей на автостраду. Метрах в пятистах сзади в снопе искр на шоссе выкатило такси.
Тучный немец, помахавший у него под носом рукой и сказавший на ломаном английском: Проваливай и умри. - С вами все в порядке? - спросила девушка, заметив, что он переменился в лице. Беккер не мог оторвать глаз от ее руки.